shell-quote's `quote()` function emits a `{ comment }` token as `#` followed by its text, which comments out the rest of the shell line, including the opening quote of any later string token. A line terminator (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029) in that later string therefore ends the comment, and the rest of the string is parsed as shell input: `quote(['echo', 'ok', { comment: 'x' }, 'a\nid;#'])` runs `id` in sh, bash, dash, ksh and zsh. `parse()` emits a comment token for a `#` in the middle of a word (for example `http://example.com/#frag`), so callers that combine `parse()` output with another untrusted string, such as `quote(parse(untrustedCommand).concat(untrustedArg))`, are affected. The fix for CVE-2026-9277 rejected line terminators in the comment's own text, but not in the tokens after it. Fixed in 1.11.0: `quote()` throws a `TypeError` when a string after a `{ comment }` token contains a line terminator.
References
Configurations
No configuration.
History
29 Sep 2026, 04:17
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| New CVE |
Information
Published : 2026-09-29 04:17
Updated : 2026-09-30 17:32
NVD link : CVE-2026-102422
Mitre link : CVE-2026-102422
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-102422
JSON object : View
Products Affected
No product.
CWE
CWE-78
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')