CVE-2026-100579

OpenClaw (npm package 'openclaw') before 2026.7.1 incorrectly trusts requester provenance in message.action. In identity-bearing Gateway deployments (authentication modes that honor caller identity and narrower operator scopes), a write-scoped caller can supply another sender's identifier to the channel authorization checks and invoke a channel action under that spoofed requester identity, reaching operations the channel adapter would have denied to the real caller. Practical impact depends on the enabled channel, the action, and the target account's permissions. Shared-secret token and password callers are full trusted operators under OpenClaw's security model and are out of scope. The issue is fixed in 2026.7.1; as a workaround, restrict message.action to administrators and disable sensitive channel actions that rely on requester identity.

CVSS v3 7.6 HIGH

7.6^/10

CVSS v3 : HIGH

Vector :

Exploitability : 2.8 / Impact : 4.7

Attack Vector NETWORK

Attack Complexity LOW

Privileges Required LOW

User Interaction NONE

Confidentiality Impact LOW

Integrity Impact HIGH

Availability Impact LOW

Scope UNCHANGED

References

Link	Resource
https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-4wvr-f35r-f8w4
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-before-2026.7.1-authentication-bypass-via-spoofed-requester

Configurations

No configuration.

History

26 Sep 2026, 03:17

Type	Values Removed	Values Added
New CVE

Information

Published : 2026-09-26 03:17

Updated : 2026-09-28 18:17

NVD link : CVE-2026-100579

Mitre link : CVE-2026-100579

CVE.ORG link : CVE-2026-100579

JSON object : View

Products Affected

No product.

CWE

CWE-639

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

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