CVE-2025-68620

{"id": "CVE-2025-68620", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2025-68620", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"exploitation": "poc"}, {"automatable": "yes"}, {"technicalImpact": "total"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-01-02T18:58:09.207181Z"}}], "cvssMetricV31": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "cvssData": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 9.1, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"}, "impactScore": 5.2, "exploitabilityScore": 3.9}]}, "affected": [{"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "affectedData": [{"vendor": "SignalK", "product": "signalk-server", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "< 2.19.0"}]}]}], "published": "2026-01-01T19:15:53.910", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/releases/tag/v2.19.0", "tags": ["Release Notes"], "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/security/advisories/GHSA-fq56-hvg6-wvm5", "tags": ["Exploit", "Vendor Advisory"], "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}], "vulnStatus": "Analyzed", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-288"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Signal K Server is a server application that runs on a central hub in a boat. Versions prior to 2.19.0 expose two features that can be chained together to steal JWT authentication tokens without any prior authentication. The attack combines WebSocket-based request enumeration with unauthenticated polling of access request status. The first is Unauthenticated WebSocket Request Enumeration: When a WebSocket client connects to the SignalK stream endpoint with the `serverevents=all` query parameter, the server sends all cached server events including `ACCESS_REQUEST` events that contain details about pending access requests. The `startServerEvents` function iterates over `app.lastServerEvents` and writes each cached event to any connected client without verifying authorization level. Since WebSocket connections are allowed for readonly users (which includes unauthenticated users when `allow_readonly` is true), attackers receive these events containing request IDs, client identifiers, descriptions, requested permissions, and IP addresses. The second is Unauthenticated Token Polling: The access request status endpoint at `/signalk/v1/access/requests/:id` returns the full state of an access request without requiring authentication. When an administrator approves a request, the response includes the issued JWT token in plaintext. The `queryRequest` function returns the complete request object including the token field, and the REST endpoint uses readonly authentication, allowing unauthenticated access. An attacker has two paths to exploit these vulnerabilities. Either the attacker creates their own access request (using the IP spoofing vulnerability to craft a convincing spoofed request), then polls their own request ID until an administrator approves it, receiving the JWT token; or the attacker passively monitors the WebSocket stream to discover request IDs from legitimate devices, then polls those IDs and steals the JWT tokens when administrators approve them, hijacking legitimate device credentials. Both paths require zero authentication and enable complete authentication bypass. Version 2.19.0 fixes the underlying issues."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "Signal K Server es una aplicaci\u00f3n de servidor que se ejecuta en un concentrador central en un barco. Las versiones anteriores a la 2.19.0 exponen dos caracter\u00edsticas que pueden encadenarse para robar tokens de autenticaci\u00f3n JWT sin ninguna autenticaci\u00f3n previa. El ataque combina la enumeraci\u00f3n de solicitudes basada en WebSocket con el sondeo no autenticado del estado de las solicitudes de acceso. La primera es la enumeraci\u00f3n de solicitudes WebSocket no autenticadas: Cuando un cliente WebSocket se conecta al endpoint de flujo de SignalK con el par\u00e1metro de consulta 'serverevents=all', el servidor env\u00eda todos los eventos de servidor en cach\u00e9, incluidos los eventos 'ACCESS_REQUEST' que contienen detalles sobre las solicitudes de acceso pendientes. La funci\u00f3n 'startServerEvents' itera sobre 'app.lastServerEvents' y escribe cada evento en cach\u00e9 a cualquier cliente conectado sin verificar el nivel de autorizaci\u00f3n. Dado que las conexiones WebSocket est\u00e1n permitidas para usuarios de solo lectura (lo que incluye a los usuarios no autenticados cuando 'allow_readonly' es verdadero), los atacantes reciben estos eventos que contienen IDs de solicitud, identificadores de cliente, descripciones, permisos solicitados y direcciones IP. La segunda es el sondeo de tokens no autenticados: El endpoint de estado de solicitud de acceso en /signalk/v1/access/requests/:id devuelve el estado completo de una solicitud de acceso sin requerir autenticaci\u00f3n. Cuando un administrador aprueba una solicitud, la respuesta incluye el token JWT emitido en texto plano. La funci\u00f3n 'queryRequest' devuelve el objeto de solicitud completo, incluido el campo del token, y el endpoint REST utiliza autenticaci\u00f3n de solo lectura, lo que permite el acceso no autenticado. Un atacante tiene dos caminos para explotar estas vulnerabilidades. O el atacante crea su propia solicitud de acceso (utilizando la vulnerabilidad de suplantaci\u00f3n de IP para elaborar una solicitud suplantada convincente), luego sondea su propio ID de solicitud hasta que un administrador la aprueba, recibiendo el token JWT; o el atacante monitorea pasivamente el flujo de WebSocket para descubrir IDs de solicitud de dispositivos leg\u00edtimos, luego sondea esos IDs y roba los tokens JWT cuando los administradores los aprueban, secuestrando credenciales de dispositivos leg\u00edtimos. Ambos caminos requieren cero autenticaci\u00f3n y permiten una omisi\u00f3n de autenticaci\u00f3n completa. La versi\u00f3n 2.19.0 corrige los problemas subyacentes."}], "lastModified": "2026-10-07T11:10:00.153", "configurations": [{"nodes": [{"negate": false, "cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:signalk:signal_k_server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "102A9593-CCDC-4532-8201-E67EEFC665E0", "versionEndExcluding": "2.19.0"}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:signalk:signal_k_server:2.19.0:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "67C0C9C4-176E-457B-97BF-56EED79F4D42"}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:signalk:signal_k_server:2.19.0:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "0F33D560-D916-45D7-AAF6-63E89BE06805"}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:signalk:signal_k_server:2.19.0:beta3:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "2B544F41-AFE7-454F-BE01-89AC7B954AF5"}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:signalk:signal_k_server:2.19.0:beta4:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "BCF3D7E0-66FE-47F1-97BA-ABCF769B0D7C"}], "operator": "OR"}]}], "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"}