CVE-2025-42615

{"id": "CVE-2025-42615", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2025-42615", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2025-12-08T16:58:48.964002Z"}}], "cvssMetricV40": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "a6d3dc9e-0591-4a13-bce7-0f5b31ff6158", "cvssData": {"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "version": "4.0", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 8.1, "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X", "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "userInteraction": "ACTIVE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "HIGH", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED", "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED"}}]}, "affected": [{"source": "a6d3dc9e-0591-4a13-bce7-0f5b31ff6158", "affectedData": [{"vendor": "CIRCL", "product": "Vulnerability-Lookup", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "0", "lessThan": "2.18.0", "versionType": "semver"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}]}], "published": "2025-12-08T12:16:03.497", "references": [{"url": "https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2025-0033", "source": "a6d3dc9e-0591-4a13-bce7-0f5b31ff6158"}], "vulnStatus": "Deferred", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "a6d3dc9e-0591-4a13-bce7-0f5b31ff6158", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-307"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "In affected versions, vulnerability-lookup did not track or limit failed\n One-Time Password (OTP) attempts during Two-Factor Authentication (2FA)\n verification. An attacker who already knew or guessed a valid username \nand password could submit an arbitrary number of OTP codes without \ncausing the account to be locked or generating any specific alert for \nadministrators.\n\n\nThis lack of rate-limiting and lockout on OTP failures significantly \nlowers the cost of online brute-force attacks against 2FA codes and \nincreases the risk of successful account takeover, especially if OTP \nentropy is reduced (e.g. short numeric codes, user reuse, or predictable\n tokens). Additionally, administrators had no direct visibility into \naccounts experiencing repeated 2FA failures, making targeted attacks \nharder to detect and investigate.\n\n\nThe patch introduces a persistent failed_otp_attempts counter on user \naccounts, locks the user after 5 invalid OTP submissions, resets the \ncounter on successful verification, and surfaces failed 2FA attempts in \nthe admin user list. This enforces an account lockout policy for OTP \nbrute-force attempts and improves monitoring capabilities for suspicious\n 2FA activity.This issue affects Vulnerability-Lookup: before 2.18.0."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "En las versiones afectadas, vulnerability-lookup no rastreaba ni limitaba los intentos fallidos de Contrase\u00f1a de Un Solo Uso (OTP) durante la verificaci\u00f3n de Autenticaci\u00f3n de Dos Factores (2FA). Un atacante que ya conoc\u00eda o adivin\u00f3 un nombre de usuario y una contrase\u00f1a v\u00e1lidos pod\u00eda enviar un n\u00famero arbitrario de c\u00f3digos OTP sin provocar el bloqueo de la cuenta ni generar ninguna alerta espec\u00edfica para los administradores.\n\nEsta falta de limitaci\u00f3n de velocidad y bloqueo en los fallos de OTP reduce significativamente el coste de los ataques de fuerza bruta en l\u00ednea contra c\u00f3digos 2FA y aumenta el riesgo de una toma de control exitosa de la cuenta, especialmente si la entrop\u00eda de OTP se reduce (p. ej., c\u00f3digos num\u00e9ricos cortos, reutilizaci\u00f3n por parte del usuario o tokens predecibles). Adem\u00e1s, los administradores no ten\u00edan visibilidad directa sobre las cuentas que experimentaban fallos repetidos de 2FA, lo que hac\u00eda que los ataques dirigidos fueran m\u00e1s dif\u00edciles de detectar e investigar.\n\nEl parche introduce un contador persistente de failed_otp_attempts en las cuentas de usuario, bloquea al usuario despu\u00e9s de 5 env\u00edos de OTP inv\u00e1lidos, restablece el contador tras una verificaci\u00f3n exitosa y muestra los intentos fallidos de 2FA en la lista de usuarios administradores. Esto impone una pol\u00edtica de bloqueo de cuenta para los intentos de fuerza bruta de OTP y mejora las capacidades de monitoreo para actividad sospechosa de 2FA. Este problema afecta a Vulnerability-Lookup: antes de 2.18.0."}], "lastModified": "2026-10-14T22:10:00.210", "sourceIdentifier": "a6d3dc9e-0591-4a13-bce7-0f5b31ff6158"}