CVE-2024-13942

{"id": "CVE-2024-13942", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2024-13942", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "total"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-08-19T19:08:57.606738Z"}}], "cvssMetricV31": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "vulnerability@kaspersky.com", "cvssData": {"scope": "CHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 7.6, "attackVector": "PHYSICAL", "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"}, "impactScore": 6.0, "exploitabilityScore": 0.9}]}, "affected": [{"source": "vulnerability@kaspersky.com", "affectedData": [{"vendor": "Rockchip", "modules": ["Secure BootROM"], "product": "RK3588s", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "350B20210512V100"}], "defaultStatus": "unknown"}]}], "published": "2026-08-19T17:18:21.440", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/klsecservices/Advisories/blob/master/KLSA-00230-Rockchip-RK3588s-Secure-BootROM-TOCTOU-vulnerability.md", "source": "vulnerability@kaspersky.com"}, {"url": "https://www.rock-chips.com/a/en/products/RK35_Series/2022/0926/1660.html", "source": "vulnerability@kaspersky.com"}, {"url": "https://www.rock-chips.com/a/en/psirt/vdp.html", "source": "vulnerability@kaspersky.com"}], "vulnStatus": "Deferred", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Secondary", "source": "vulnerability@kaspersky.com", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-367"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Secure BootROM of RK3588s SoC is vulnerable to a time-of-check to time-of-use attack in case of booting from external media (SPI NOR or NAND, EMMC or SD).\n\n\n\n\nThe code reads the header of the next-stage loader twice. The header contains hashes of the executable modules and is signed with a private key, the public part of which is verified against the SHA256 digest blown in the OTP.\n\n\n\n\nThe first read is only partial and contains only the hashes of the executable modules. The second is complete, including the header signature.\n\nAlthough the header is verified based on the fully read data, the authenticity of the executable modules is checked against the partial data from the first read.\n\n\n\n\nAn attacker with physical access to a device containing RK3588s SoC can easily modify the next-stage loader data on-the-fly using a low-cost SD-card or SPI NOR/NAND or EMMC emulator. Even a simple ultra low-cost circuit comprising two memory chips (containing the same data but different headers - the original and the modified one) and a multiplexer can be used to carry out an attack.\n\n\n\n\nThis can lead to arbitrary code execution with the highest privileges available (EL3). This issue affects RK3588s: RK3588s SoC BootROM (secure) 350B20210512V100 and possibly others.\nAs remediation apply mitigations per vendor instructions or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable https://www.rock-chips.com/a/en/products/RK35_Series/2022/0926/1660.html"}, {"lang": "es", "value": "El BootROM seguro del SoC RK3588s es vulnerable a un ataque de tiempo de verificaci\u00f3n a tiempo de uso en caso de arranque desde medios externos (SPI NOR o NAND, EMMC o SD).\n\nEl c\u00f3digo lee el encabezado del cargador de siguiente etapa dos veces. El encabezado contiene hashes de los m\u00f3dulos ejecutables y est\u00e1 firmado con una clave privada, cuya parte p\u00fablica se verifica contra el resumen SHA256 grabado en la OTP.\n\nLa primera lectura es solo parcial y contiene solo los hashes de los m\u00f3dulos ejecutables. La segunda es completa, incluyendo la firma del encabezado.\n\nAunque el encabezado se verifica bas\u00e1ndose en los datos le\u00eddos completamente, la autenticidad de los m\u00f3dulos ejecutables se verifica contra los datos parciales de la primera lectura.\n\nUn atacante con acceso f\u00edsico a un dispositivo que contiene el SoC RK3588s puede modificar f\u00e1cilmente los datos del cargador de siguiente etapa sobre la marcha utilizando un emulador de tarjeta SD o SPI NOR/NAND o EMMC de bajo costo. Incluso un circuito simple de ultra bajo costo que comprende dos chips de memoria (que contienen los mismos datos pero diferentes encabezados - el original y el modificado) y un multiplexor puede usarse para llevar a cabo un ataque.\n\nEsto puede llevar a la ejecuci\u00f3n de c\u00f3digo arbitrario con los privilegios m\u00e1s altos disponibles (EL3). Este problema afecta a RK3588s: RK3588s SoC BootROM (seguro) 350B20210512V100 y posiblemente a otros.\nComo remediaci\u00f3n, aplique mitigaciones seg\u00fan las instrucciones del proveedor o descontin\u00fae el uso del producto si las mitigaciones no est\u00e1n disponibles https://www.rock-chips.com/a/en/products/RK35_Series/2022/0926/1660.html"}], "lastModified": "2026-10-01T23:10:00.233", "sourceIdentifier": "vulnerability@kaspersky.com"}